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Solicitation By and For Attorneys
Richard R. Gygli* and Gordon W. Larson**
T HE YOUNG ATTORNEY often may have time on his hands. He
may be tempted to increase his following by advertising or
by soliciting clients, but rules of the bar and statutes against
solicitation prevent this.
There are, of course, some forms of advertising open to all
lawyers. National directories and law lists, such as the Martin-
dale-Hubbell Law Directory,1 theoretically published only for
lawyers, not only advertise the attorney and his firm, but also
list the names of any clients whom he wishes to give as rep-
resentative of his practice and his specialties. The Martindale-
Hubbell directory estimates net worth and legal ability, basing
ability on a scale of "very high," "high," and "fair" which takes
into account years of experience, and also gives or withholds
a recommendation. Any person, corporation, or lawyer 2 inter-
ested in selecting suitable counsel need only consult the direc-
tory. There has been no prohibition against such advertising,
and in the opinion of the authors, there would be no breach of
professional ethics if a similar directory of all lawyers were pro-
duced and disseminated by the bar associations for wide public
use on a local basis.
Practicing attorneys have a legitimate interest in the pro-
fession, and they must be ever alert to insure that the high
purpose of the profession does not bow to pressure from within
and/or without to lower the standards-standards which tend
to keep the practice of law independent and free of the monopoly
or dominance which non-legal organizations can win for their
"counsel" over certain classes of clients at the expense of bar
members not connected with those associations. 3 These standards
*Of Cleveland; Member of the Ohio Bar.
** Of Gates Mills, Ohio; Member of the Ohio Bar.
1 Published by Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., One Prospect St., Summit, N. J.
2 A lawyer may be seeking out-of-state aid.
a This does not include attorneys employed by corporations. The attorney
represents the corporation but cannot practice law for the corporation for
the reason that a master-servant relation exists between himself and the
corporation to the exclusion of an attorney-client relation between himself
and any client of the corporation. A corporation cannot practice law.
Meisel & Co. v. Nat'l. Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 Misc. 19, 152 N. Y. S. 913,
916 (1915); Midland Credit Adj. Co. v. Donnelby, 219 Ill. App. 271, 275
(1920).
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also prevent individual attorneys from operating "feeder" busi-
nesses for the purpose of soliciting legal work, where the legal
work is more remunerative than the "feeder" operation. The
standards apply against direct solicitation and advertising, such
as "ambulance chasing." Competitive business practices for ob-
taining new or retaining old clients are looked upon with disdain
when utilized by members of the bar. Thus, the attorney-at-law
lives by a professional code of ethics largely at odds with the
practices of our commercial society. The most circumspect atti-
tude is necessary in order not to overstep the customs and ethics
of his gentleman's profession.
With rare exceptions lawyers conscientiously observe these
rules of the profession as expressed in the Canons of Ethics and
rulings of the American Bar Association 4 and the other state and
local bars. Even so, a lawyer sometimes may yield to his pride
in his practice or the interest of others in it, and violate the
code, committing what Canon 27 5 of the American Bar Associa-
tion Code calls self-laudation. Such an offense recently came
to the attention of the Florida Bar. The Miami News sought an
interview with a local attorney concerning his practice. His
large negligence practice, his new, circular design, five-story
office building, and the organization of his investigative staff,
were all of admittedly newsworthy character. The interview
resulted in a full-page article with pictures in the Sunday sup-
plement of the newspaper a few weeks later. As a result, the
Grievance Committee of the Florida Bar recommended a private
reprimand of the lawyer for having violated Canon 27. The
Board of Governors of the Florida Bar, on review, recommended
a public reprimand. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Florida,
in 1963, 6 had to interpret the American Bar Association's Canons
of Legal Ethics as they applied to the case. Canon 27 lists in part
various offenses relating to unethical behavior, including
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph
to be published in connection with causes in which the law-
yer has been engaged or concerning the manner of their con-
duct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
4 American Bar Association, Opinions of the Committee on Professional
Ethics and Grievances with the Canons of Professional Ethics Annotated
1-44 (1957).
5 Id. at 19.
6 State of Florida ex rel. the Florida Bar v. Nichols, ___ Fla __ 151 So. 2d
257 (1963).
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of the lawyer's position . . . and all other like self-laudation
(which) offend the traditions and lower the tone of our pro-
fession.7 (Emphasis added.)
The court had to determine the permissibility, under the
rule of Canon 27, of granting an interview to news reporters for
the purpose of publication of matters sure to be blameworthy if
instigated by the attorney himself. The court was sure that, if
the defendant had solicited the news article himself, Canon 27
was violated. The court found that the article was not solicited.
The rule could then have been drawn, as H. S. Drinker (a most
respected writer in this field) has written, that a law firm may
not acquiesce in the publication by a magazine of a laudatory
history of the firm.8 The Florida court, however, preferred to use
the tests of good faith and good taste. Since they could find no
clear showing of a lack of good faith and good taste and, in con-
sideration of the fact that a "lawyer's integrity and his good
name are his most precious assets," 9 the court dismissed the
complaint. It appears that absence of overt effort is not a suffi-
cient protection against charges of solicitation. The ethical law-
yer can never rely on others, nor on the nature of the facts, to
exercise the proper restraint. He must himself be the watchdog
for Canon 27.10
The lawyer, in the course of his duty, often finds himself in
close association with professional men in other fields, such as the
certified public accountant, and with laymen and organizations
which, in the course of business, are working with problems and
performing services associated with, or included in, the legal
services commonly executed by an attorney. Only by extra care
can situations be forestalled that violate the spirit of the canons
of ethics. The confidential and fiduciary character," which is
the touchstone of the attorney-client relation, gives the client the
right to expect and receive from the lawyer the application of all
Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 19.
8 Drinker, Legal Ethics, 260 (1953).
9 Florida v. Nichols, supra n. 6 at 261.
10 In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N. E. 2d 272, 105 A. L. R.
1360 (1936). Nothing should exist between attorney and client to destroy
the confidential and fiduciary relationship.
11 In re Droker, 59 Wash. 2d 722, 370 P. 2d 242 (1962). Escrow business be-
longing to attorney was operated as an assembly line, including preparation
of documents (by a layman). Held to be unethical practice of law. Firm
advertisements were also unethical solicitation.
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his professional ability in rendering such service. 12 If there exist
legal problems not apparent to the client, it is the lawyer's duty
to so advise him concerning them.13 For example, an attorney-
at-law may allow a non-attorney to conduct a business in his
office and to advertise such business, such as the preparation of
simple tax returns, which in itself is not the practice of law and
does not require the attention of the attorney.14 In such a situ-
ation, the client has the right to expect the attorney's advice on
the law there involved. If the matter goes unnoticed by the at-
torney, as a routine tax return not worthy of his attention, the
client's rights may well be adversely affected, and the lawyer
may have quite unintentionally violated the ethical spirit under-
lying the profession.5 This example illustrates the ethical pit-
falls inherent in non-legal services conducted in the attorney's
office but performed by laymen. It is obvious, of course, that
there can be intentional violation by using such a business asso-
ciation as a "feeder" to supply legal business to the attorney that
may arise in the pursuance of the non-legal business. Therefore,
the courts have discountenanced such "feeder" services as tax
consultants, collection agents, stock brokers, estate planning
services, mortgage services, and insurance adjusters bureaus.
These services are viewed as channels through which other legal
business will flow with no ethical safeguards against intentional
or unintentional harm. The lawyer and his office cannot render
two distinct services at once and not violate his professional
ethics. Nor can such services be advertised in good conscience
with no expectation of such advertising being an indirect solici-
tation on his behalf for his professional employment.
The courts have reserved to themselves the right to define
what is and what is not the practice of law 6 and to control any
12 Ibid.
13 The Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American
Bar Association has noted that although a layman can lawfully render a
service, such as preparing a tax return, it does not necessarily mean that
it would not be a professional service when rendered by a lawyer. On the
contrary, lawyers are frequently called upon to render such service for the
very reason that it can be better rendered by a lawyer. Opinion No. 57 of
the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association (March 19, 1932).
14 State of Wisconsin v. L. A. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N. W. 2d 452
(1963).
15 Chicago Bar Association v. Friedlander, 24 Ill. App. 2d 130, 164 N. E. 2d
517 (1960). The courts are not going to define practice of law any more than
they will in any mixed question of law and fact.
16 Op. cit. supra n. 4, at 19.
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such practices, whether they are maintained by members of the
bar or by laymen and business organizations. If the duties and
rights of the practice of law were not so jealously guarded, it
would be common to find laymen performing legal services with
impunity and soliciting business to their gain and to the loss of
the profession. The result, if the process were not halted, might
be that the majority of attorneys would be forced to abandon
the independent practice of law for employment with one of the
many quasi-legal services and forms of business.
How, and in what way, can the line be drawn between the
ethical and the unethical acquisition of clients? In 1908, the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,
under the title of Canons of Professional Ethics, codified the his-
toric rules against solicitation. The nineteenth century saw the
relaxation of restraints on solicitation. The enforcement of these
Canons of the American Bar Association is illustrated in the
interpretive opinions enumerated in the American Bar Associa-
tion reports and generally followed by the several state and
local bar associations. A glance at a few of these "do not" opin-
ions of the Bar will suffice to indicate the general tone that they
set for the profession to follow.
An attorney may not advertise, whether it be in newspapers,
on radio, TV, or in magazines. 7 He is not permitted to use large
signs, whether electrical or not, to solicit business or to indicate
the presence of his office.' 8 A small sign, which is permitted only
at his place of business, may show simply that he is an "Attorney"
or "Lawyer" and give his name unostentatiously. 19 The sign
may not declare his specialty 20 in the law, such as personal in-
jury. Nor may it set out a connection with any service or busi-
ness with which he may be associated, such as real estate broker-
age; or show that he acts in a dual capacity, as for example, an
attorney and a certified public accountant. 21 In short, the law-
yer may not, in any way, advertise or solicit legal business,
either directly as an attorney, or indirectly by association with
any other business or service.22
17 A. B. A. unpublished Decision #132, N. Y. City Opinion 3.
18 Ibid.
19 N. Y. City Opinion 963; N. Y. County Opinion 375; Canon 46.
20 In re Gibbs, 35 Ariz. 346, 278 P. 371 (1929); In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass.
374, 3 N. E. 2d 749, 106 A. L. R. 542 (1936).
21 Ibid.
22 Michigan Opinion 28.
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The practicing attorney is not allowed to seek out a client
even though he has knowledge of or knows how he may be pro-
fessionally helpful to the particular legal problem of the person
involved. He must instead wait for the client to seek him. He
may not go out and obtain business or even solicit business of
his own friends. Indeed, it may not be wholly ethical to mention
the simple fact that he is a lawyer when engaging in social con-
versation. He may, when first admitted to the Bar, send a dig-
nified announcement to those with whom he has already gained
a personal relationship, but not a general circular to the public
at large.23 He may also send notice of a change in address, or
change in firm, but only under the same conditions.24 He may
give out a professional card, but with no more information than
his name, business or home address and the words "Attorney"
or "Counselor of Law." 25 The prohibitions of the Code are set
out in specifics such as those above, while what is permissive is
defined only as a matter of good faith and taste.
In general, the true test of solicitation is intent. Recommen-
dations and referrals by close personal friends or relatives to a
lawyer will not involve the attorney in a breach of ethics as long
as he doesn't solicit the help. However, if he paid the contact or
suggested that he solicit for him, even if a relative, such conduct
is unethical. If legal services are offered gratuitously to an
organization with the expectation of clients being referred to
him, such agreement is unethical.26 Damage done to the standing
of the profession because of unethical solicitation is immeasur-
able, and it is most evident in the sense with which the public
applies the term "ambulance chasing."
The courts have the right to discipline attorneys on the
theory that the practice of law is a privilege and not a right, and
it is the court's solemn duty to protect that privilege from those
who would abuse it. We now have legislation by which the court
can enforce, by penal statute, the ethics of the profession. The
passage of two sections of the Ohio Revised Code,27 for example,
joined Ohio to the majority of states with "anti-solicitation"
23 Drinker, Legal Ethics, 232 (1953).
24 A. B. A. Opinion 251.
25 Ibid.
26 A. B. A. Opinion 169 at 342.
27 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 4705.08, 4705.99B (1961). See Warren, Solicitation
of Legal Services a Crime, 22 Ohio St. L. J. 691 (1961).
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bills.28 While such statutes at first appear to burden the lawyer,
nevertheless they may well strengthen the profession.
A chain of significant rulings concerning third-party solicita-
tion and advertising may have halted entirely the twentieth cen-
tury trend toward stricter rules on solicitation. The now ap-
proved use of legal aid departments because of the cases of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People has raised problems
which may significantly limit the power of the state courts to
control the employment and use of counsel.28 a Various bar asso-
ciations many times in the past have brought charges against the
attorneys and unions involved in mutual benefit arrangements
on the grounds of violation of the canons of ethics. This pro-
cedure was at first successful in curbing such practices. For in-
stance, it was held in Columbus Bar Association v. Potts29 that
an attorney, who allowed his name to be used at Transport
Worker Union meetings as an attorney who would represent the
individual members in F. E. L. A. cases in which they were in-
volved, and who also allowed his name to be sent in written
publications to members and posted on the union bulletin board,
violated Canons 27,30 28,31 34,32 35,33 and 47,34 and the offender
was subject to indefinite suspension. It was similarly held re-
cently in Cleveland Bar Association v. Fleck.3 5 There the attor-
ney entered into a contract with a labor union whereby he
agreed to represent the individual union members before the
Industrial Commission of Ohio in Workmen's Compensation
cases, and appeared at union meetings for solicitation purposes.
The court held that the attorney was breeding litigation and he
was suspended indefinitely.
28 See, for example, re Committee on Rule 28 of Cleveland Bar Assoc., 15
Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Ohio App. 1933); Doughty et al v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App.
63, 260 S. W. 2d 379 (1952).
28a See, Markus, Group Representation by Attorneys as Misconduct, 14
Clev-Mar. L. R. 1 (1965); and see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corps., Orgns. &
Assns. (2d ed., 1965).
29 Columbus Bar Association v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 23 Ohio Op. 2d 392,
191 N. E. 2d 728 (1963).
30 Op. cit. supra n. 4 at 19 (Advertising, Direct or Indirect).
31 Id. at 25 (Stirring up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents).
32 Id. at 31 (Division of Fees).
33 Id. at 33 (Intermediaries).
34 Id. at 43 (Approved Law Lists).
35 Cleveland Bar Association v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N. E. 2d 782
(1961).
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In In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the Illinois
Supreme Court faced a more complex problem of solicitation. In
this case, the union had set up a legal aid department consisting
of regional districts throughout the country, with each district
represented by a regional counsel who was also engaged in pri-
vate practice. These counsel handled all claims arising out of
railroad accidents involving members of the union in their area.
All investigative work was done by union employees and was
paid for by the regional counsel. The union investigators, in turn,
carried blank copies of contracts which they induced the claim-
ants to sign, employing the regional counsel's firm to handle the
litigation. The fee charged by the firm was a fixed percentage
for every suit. The court, after saying that a union has the right
to investigate claims for its members and recommend generally
attorneys whom it feels are qualified, held that the conduct of
the regional counsel resulted in solicitation and fee splitting and,
therefore, was both illegal and unprofessional. The relationship
of the attorney and client, the court continued, must remain an
individual and personal one.
While the preceding representative cases appeared to show
a firm stand in this area of ethical jurisprudence, an omen of
change was visible as far back as 1950 in a dissenting opinion
by Justice Carter of the California Supreme Court.37 This re-
markable dissent 3 laid the groundwork for a United States Su-
preme Court decision in 1964. In it, Justice Carter labeled con-
demnation (by the majority) of such legal aid departments as
"a misguided venture in the field of legal ethics." 39 He asserted
that the Brotherhood's arrangement, with its "regional counsel,"
was not unlike the employment of attorneys by other organiza-
tions such as merchants' associations where, during the course
of such employment, such attorneys handle cases for individual
members of such organizations. The essential difference between
"runners" and such a plan is that the legal aid department does
not exist to solicit clients for the attorneys associated with the
plan. 
40
36 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N. E. 2d 163 (1958).
37 Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P. 2d 508
(1950).
38 Id., 225 P. 2d at 514.
39 Id. at 518.
40 N. A. A. C. P. v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S. E. 2d 55, 65 (1960).
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The United States Supreme Court, in Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel., Virginia State Bar,41 adopted
the Hildebrand dissent for its own. There, under the same facts
as the preceding Brotherhood cases, the Virginia State Bar As-
sociation enjoined the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, an
investigator employed by the Brotherhood, and its regional coun-
sel in Virginia from collaborating to solicit legal business. The
union ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme Court on
the grounds that the state had denied it its constitutional rights
as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The majority opinion of the Court sustained this
contention and held that although a state had the right to regu-
late the practice of law within its borders, it could not do so at
the expense of the individual's constitutional rights to freedom
of speech and assembly. The Court further stated that railroad
workers, as authorized by Congressional legislation 42 had the
right to assemble and give advice to one another, and it neces-
sarily followed that legal advice was included in that right. That
the union membership under the direction of its president chose
one attorney in each region to consult with and be represented
by, was both completely reasonable and logical. Any attorney,
therefore, the Court concluded, who accepted employment under
this plan was likewise protected from state interference.
The serious consequences for the practice of law resulting
from this opinion are best summed up in Mr. Justice Clark's dis-
senting opinion, where he said: "By its decision today the Court
overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates
the practice of law to the level of a commercial enterprise." 43
Probably most attorneys will feel that, if bar regulation cannot
be extended to counsel for organizations which have an inde-
pendent existence and purpose of their own, it will be a little
easier now to show that certain "feeder" businesses are suffi-
ciently independent or self-sustaining.
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People brought to the Supreme Court of the United States an-
other occasion of the use of a legal aid department for the fur-
41 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,
84 S. Ct. 1113, 377 U. S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1964).
42 Safety Appliance Act, 45 U. S. C., Sec. 1-43; Federal Employees Liability
Act, 45 U. S. C., Sec. 51-60.
43 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, supra n. 41 at 12 L. Ed.
2d 95.
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therance of the objectives of the association. 44 The N. A. A. C. P.
employed trial counsel directly and paid all costs of litigation
out of its own funds. These facts violated a chapter 45 of the Vir-
ginia Acts of Assembly which defines champerty, barratry and
maintenance. The Court found that the Virginia statute vio-
lated the First Amendment protection of the exercise of consti-
tutional rights, which includes vigorous advocacy of rights. It
also noted that the N. A. A. C. P. exists as a means of obtain-
ing political and lawful objectives and not to resolve private dif-
ferences. The Court also observed that protection of such group
advocacy was constitutionally guaranteed, and held that where
such group activity is in conflict with state statutes and court
control of professional ethics, the constitutional rights must pre-
vail.
Conclusion
Solicitation by and for attorneys has been and will continue
to be a difficult problem. The bar and bench no doubt will
continue strict watch over unprofessional efforts to gain clients,
such as "feeder" operations and "ambulance chasing." On the
other hand, the bar could very well take more positive action
to make more generally known its members and their services
locally, such as through the law directories mentioned above.
This could help, especially in giving the younger attorney a more
solid position in the community.
In view of the recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions discussed above, the bar must just as importantly con-
tinue to concern itself with the possibility of violation of the
Canons of Ethics by organizations and non-profit associations
which merge their litigable interests with the practice of law.
There is ample room here for unethical practice which amounts
to solicitation as prohibited by the Canons of Ethics. Such
organizations can supply the attorney with a fertile field for
clients, and can actively recommend (even insist upon) his
abilities without hiring him on its payroll nor restricting his
other practice. They can charge as they will for their services
to him, such as investigative work, and, in effect at least, split
44 N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963).
45 Chapter 33 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1956 Extra Session. In
N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, supra, n. 44, the Supreme Court said that advising
another that his legal rights have been infringed and referring him to a
particular attorney for assistance and thereafter rendering legal assistance
to the person thus referred, could not be justified under the state's interest
in regulating barratry, champerty and maintenance and would unconstitu-
tionally restrict the N. A. A. C. P.'s freedom of expression and association.
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or share the attorney's fee. The Supreme Court, in the
N. A. A. C. P. and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen cases did
not give constitutional protection to the attorneys involved in
such plans, but only to the rights of the associations to further
their interests by combining for litigation purposes. Neverthe-
less, the effect of the decisions may well be to take away some
of the regulation that the bar hitherto has exercised over its
members.
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